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PETER RIETBERGEN
Upon a silk thread?
Relations between the Safavid court of Persia 
and the Dutch East Indies Company, 1623-1722
Introduction
Those who entered the Persian capital Isfahan in the mid seventeenth cen­
tury -  when it was reported to count nearly a million inhabitants, a number 
unequalled in any European town -  could not fail to be impressed, especially 
when their journey ended on the majdan. The huge rectangular space -  512 by 
159 meters -  was lined with arcades on two floors. At regular intervals, beau­
tiful trees bordered the square. In front of these, the pavement was broken by 
a shallow canal demarcating the piazza proper. Marble bridges linked it to 
the space under the arcades, which contained shops on both floors as well as 
the entrances to the city's main bazaars. The grand Masjid-i Shah, the royal 
mosque, stood at the south side. This complex of architecture surrounding 
trees and water -  there were fountains besides the canal -  embodied the ide­
als of desert princes who wanted to turn their cities into an oasis.
At the piazza's west side, the Ali Qapu rose, the great palace gate, tiled 
in blue and gold, its main door surrounded by green porphyry. To the left 
and right of it, nine chained lions were kept.1 Behind it, the Safavid shahs, 
like their Ottoman colleagues behind the High Porte, received their visitors: 
lowly subjects, mighty vassal princes and, of course, people from abroad, 
foreigners, both high-born ambassadors and simple merchants and artisans.2 
This essay is concerned with a particular group of such merchants -  those 
employed by the Dutch East Indies Company, or VOC -  and their relations 
with the Persian court.
1 For the palace gate, see Hotz 1908:271.
2 Useful introductions to Safavid history are found in Savory 1980, especially chapters 4, 5 
and 8, and Morgan 1988, especially chapters 11-15.
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Beginnings
In 1623, Hubert Visnich arrived in Isfahan, sent there by the Dutch East Indies 
Company to sound out the possibilities of a formal commercial relationship. 
He was instructed to negotiate free trade with Persia, including freedom of 
all import and export duties.3 Thus, the ruler of Persia, Shah Abbas I (reigned 
1588-1629), knew that, after earlier failures to engage the major European pow­
ers (Spain, the emperor, the pope) in his battle against the Ottoman enemy, 
he was given another chance to try and do so with a nation whose interest in 
his empire was, perhaps, more immediate.4 Consequently, in the same year 
1623, Abbas granted the VOC a 'favorable conditie totten handel' -  'favour­
able conditions under which they could trade', that is, a treaty which gave the 
Company access to the Persian ports and led the Heren XVII to immediately 
free the monies and goods necessary to implement the new trade.5 It was, 
mainly, silk that tied the knot between the Dutch and the Persians, for Dutch 
trade in Persia was made dependent on the Company agreeing to annually 
buy a given amount of silk -  a royal monopoly -  at a pre-established price;6 
in return, they not only would be free to trade in other wares, but also be 
exempted from the more onerous tolls and taxes -  or so they thought.
In the same year, Abbas decided to send an ambassador, Musa Beg, to 
'the King of Holland' with gifts of silk, precious carpets and turquoises. 
Though the Heren XVII well realized the shah was concerned more about 
'compliments and political affairs than about the Company's trade'7 and 
were rather anxious not to get mixed up in any 'materie van staedt, ofte ons 
ergens in te ingageren'8 -  they would take care not to become embroiled in 
matters of state, or allow themselves to get involved in his affairs -  they took 
good care to make certain that the States General would receive the Persian 
envoy with all due ceremony. Consequently, Musa Beg, on his arrival in 
The Hague, was met by the Prince of Orange, with a suite of no less than 36 
carriages.9 He told Their High Mightinesses that his master wanted noth­
ing less than that the Dutch sever all commercial and political ties with the 
Ottoman empire, would help him recapture the cities and islands conquered 
by the Portuguese in the Gulf area and, moreover, should stop trading with
3 Visnich's instruction, dated 27-1-1623, has been published by Dunlop 1930:677-9.
4 Old, but for its documentation still valuable is Bayani 1937.
5 The capitulations of 1623 and 1629 have been published by Dunlop 1930:679-82.
6 For a succinct analysis see Floor 1996:323-68.
7 Accoding to the resolutions of the States General, 8-4-1626: 'complimenten ende politique 
saecken, als om haere negotie' (Dunlop 1930:692).
8 Dunlop 1930:157, no. 79.
9 Dunlop 1930:195, no. 101, XVII to Visnich, 4-8-1626. For the resolutions of the States General 
concerning the mission of Musa Beg see Dunlop 1930:687-720.
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the many Armenians who, actually, were the most successful middlemen 
between the economy of his empire and the West; instead, the Dutch would 
deal with merchants approved by him, only.10
Obviously, the States General were unwilling to compromise their com­
mercial and political interests in the Mediterranean by entering into the first 
and last proposal. As to the first, less than completely honestly, but very 
politically they answered Abbas that the consuls in the Ottoman empire were 
the private employees of the Dutch merchants trading therein. However, if 
the Ottomans continued to hamper Dutch trade, these merchants would of 
course be only too glad to turn to the protection of the Persians. About the 
Armenians: not a word -  perhaps because the Dutch hoped the shah would 
understand this to be a 'private' matter, too.11 Nevertheless, in later years, 
when trade with Persia had established itself, the Company noted that the 
export of Persian wares -  including large quantities of silk -  via Aleppo 
and the Armenian merchants, was detrimental to their own position on the 
European (silk) market; hence, they ordered their representatives to at least 
try and 'divert' the Persian traders in their own direction.12
While all this must have been disappointing to the shah, his second proposal 
was warmly welcomed indeed: the States General wrote they would gladly 
join him in any policy that would lead 'tot afbreuck van syne ende onse vian- 
den', -  that would harm his and our enemies -  for the Twelve Years' truce 
had just ended, and Spain and Portugal again were at war with the Dutch. 
Moreover, they would immediately order their representatives, that is the 
VOC, to enter into the necessary details.
Thus, relations between Persia and the VOC were opened. A few years 
later, the States General, by way of Governor-General J.P Coen, sent one 
Jan Smid to Isfahan, to negotiate the continuation of the first contract. Of 
course, for the Persians he was the 'ambassadeur van den grooten coninck 
van Hollant', 'the ambassador of the great king of Holland', the Prince of 
Orange. Setting off from Batavia in 1628, on his arrival in Persia in 1629 
Smid found that Abbas had died, and that his grandson, Safi I (reigned 
1629-1642) had taken his place. The new shah -  or, rather, his senior officials
-  ordered that the Dutch envoy and his suite be received with all regards, 
admonishing them 'that they should make merry and enjoy themselves to
10 Dunlop 1930:697, 699-700, ambassador Musa Beg to the States General, 11 and 18-6-1626.
11 Dunlop 1930:707-8, States General to Shah Abbas, 26-9-1626.
12 Dunlop 1930:619, no. 299, XVII to the governor-general, 25-3-1637.
13 This and the following quotes by Smid from Smid's report over the period 26-7-1628 -14-6- 
1630, Dunlop 1930:729-61: 'dat vroolijck souden sijn en goet chyer maecken'; 'somma: vernamen 
hier weynich grootsheyt off konincklijcke magnificentien'; 'plomp en rouw naer der Persiaenen 
aert, die de oude Parthen ten deelen noch verthoonen'.
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the full'.13 To this end, the shah gave the VOC-embassy a seemingly royal 
allowance -  seemingly, because the Dutch soon realized they had to spend 
a considerable part of it in gifts to those officials who were to help them 
advance their cause.
When he finally was received in audience, Smid bowed over the shah's 
hand, as if kissing it, while his men did actually touch the hem of the royal 
robe with their lips, to symbolize the ancient Persian foot kiss. Afterwards, 
watching the king conversing with his musicians and play with 'little apples' 
and, all the while, drinking heavily, Smid clearly was disappointed by the 
casualness of the reception: 'in short, we did not see or hear anything smack­
ing of grandeur here or what pertains to royal magnificence'. Even two royal 
toasts, to the health of the Prince of Orange, could not improve his impression. 
The food at the banquet that followed, though served in huge golden dishes, 
he considered 'boorish and rude, according to the Persian character, that still 
partly shows the ways of the ancient Parthians'. He was more impressed 
by the array of bejewelled bowls, goblets and vessels set out in the various 
palace galleries. At subsequent feasts, Smid was only mildly surprised to see 
the king enter totally drunk, nor by the fact that nothing of consequence was 
achieved during these parties. However, he was a little upset by the dancing 
of 'whores and sodomite youngsters, hired for the occasion'.
Political problems -  an Ottoman attack -, court intrigues, communications 
mismanagement, but also Company in-fighting between the resident VOC- 
official, Visnich, and ambassador Smid, contributed to the less than felicitous 
feelings with which the latter left the Persian capital. Yet, the renewal of the 
1623-treaty was negotiated by Visnich in 1629 and confirmed in the letters 
that Safi's officials sent to the Prince of Orange and the States General in 
1630. However, a proper comparison between the conditions agreed upon in 
1623 and the 1629-ones would have taught the Company that their erstwhile 
freedom had been much curtailed. There was, perhaps because the tolerant 
Abbas had died, no more talk of being allowed to build their own chapels, 
and efforts to convert their non-European servants to Christianity were most 
expressly forbidden. Moreover, another item that, for the future, was far 
more serious, now stood out absolutely clear: any suggestion of freedom of 
customs' duties that might have existed in the first capitulations -  admit­
tedly, based mostly on wishful reading by the Dutch -  was clearly eliminated 
from the second. Nevertheless, the capitulations of 1629 were the basis of a 
Dutch-Persian relationship that was to last for nearly a century. It is my pur­
pose to establish their mutual expectations, and outline the main problems 
that ensued from these, concentrating -  albeit not exclusively -  on the period 
around 1680-1720. To do so, both for the Dutch and, indeed, the Persian side 
of the bargain, I have studied mostly VOC sources, that are invaluable if only 
because the Safavid state archives were largely destroyed during the Afghan
Upon a silk thread? 163
occupation of Isfahan in 1722. Also, it seems that even before that, record 
keeping at the Savafid court was sloppy, to say the least.14 Yet while relying 
on Company documents,15 mainly, I yet try to look at things from a Persian 
perspective, too. Indeed, I will first analyse the reasons why the shahs, their 
court and their central administration accepted the presence of the Company 
in their lands, precisely because without their consent there would have been 
no Persian-Dutch history in the first place.
Through the court's eyes: power and the representation of power
The Safavid family derived its name from a certain fourteenth-century sheich 
from Ardebil, Safi, who pretended to descend from the martyred imams of 
Shiite Islam: Ali, the husband of Muhammad's daughter Fatma, their sons 
Hassan and Hussayn and their progeny up till the twelfth imam, who had 
gone into hiding in the ninth century. In 1499, the great-grandson of Safi, 
Ishmail, claiming to be the representative on earth of the 'Hidden Imam', 
who was yet to return, started his conquest of present-day Afghanistan, Iran 
and Iraq, thus recreating part of the old Persian empire and founding a new 
dynasty In Europe, he and his descendants were referred to as the 'Grand 
Sophy', alongside the 'Grand Turk' and the 'Grand Mogul'. In Persia, he was, 
of course, shah-in-shah, king of kings. The VOC-officials called him 'coninck' 
in their letters to the governor-general, but sometimes also addressed him as 
'keyser'. Thus, they honoured his power, which, however, they often charac­
terized as despotic and cruel. Meanwhile, they seem to not have understood 
the religious dimension of his authority.16
The Safavid dynasty ruled an empire that was almost totally agrarian: 
consequently, their history is one of constant competition with older, tribal- 
based elites for the possession of, or at least the fiscal control over the produce 
of the land.17 Greatly extending his own estates and increasing his income 
in order to create a standing army, Shah Abbas succeeded in significantly 
reducing, but certainly not in totally curbing the power of the chieftains of 
the various tribes who continued to rule some of the provinces.
Besides the struggle of the shahs with the tribal nobility who sought to 
strengthen their position in the periphery of the empire, there were various 
other factors weakening Persia internally. Raised and educated -  if at all
14 According to Dunlop 1930:xcii.
15 I mostly use the reports and letters of the governors-general of the VOC to the Gentlemen 
XVII, as published in: Generate Missiven, volume number, followed by the date of the letter(s).
16 For the background see Sabzavari 1990.
17 A valuable recent analysis that gives the background details is Floor 2000.
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-  in the harem, many shahs came to the throne less than well prepared for 
their weighty tasks. Moreover, as the Ottoman seraglio, the Persian harem 
was a place of endless intrigues that spilled over into the domain of policy 
making, fuelling the faction strife that both characterized and weakened 
central government. Also, the Islamic clergy, though nominally in line with 
the shahs whose authority, based on their imam-status, they could not well 
challenge, always sought to increase their influence, both among the people 
and at court.
On top of these internal threats, the rulers of Persia, or their chief advisers 
and decision makers, faced external problems as well, the major one being, of 
course, the constant enmity between Shiite Persia and its western neighbour, 
the Sunnite Ottoman empire. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centu­
ries, almost no year went by without the two regional superpowers cam­
paigning against each other. Less serious, perhaps, but nonetheless a threat 
was the arrival of European traders on the southern borders of Persia, from 
the early sixteenth century onwards. More precisely, in 1515 the Portuguese 
had challenged the authority of the shahs over their part of the Gulf coast, 
symbolized in the taking of the harbour-fortress of Hormuz, the key to the 
straits that led into the Gulf.
Because of all these problems, both internal and external, the shahs were 
definitely interested in relations with the VOC, though they must have 
known the representatives of the Company were more than simple traders 
and had an agenda of their own. Therefore, to the Persian court, 'managing' 
the Company was a complex game, with many variables.
The court well realized the VOC was not interested in favourable com­
mercial conditions, only, but actually, precisely to ensure these, was after 
as much independence in coastal Persia as could be reasonably obtained, 
and financially and militarily handled. Maybe, the Persian monarchs of the 
later seventeenth century even were aware of the fact that elsewhere the 
Company's policy had resulted in the loss of power and, sometimes, of ter­
ritory for various Asian princes. On the Coromandel Coast, the local rulers 
saw their sovereignty threatened by the Dutch, while, farther South, the 
emperors of Kandy were unable to prevent the VOC from taking over actual 
power in all their coastal lands.
Something similar happened to Persia, when, some twenty years after 
the beginning of its relations with the Dutch, outright war between the two 
broke out in 1645. Arguing that Isfahan did not honour its obligations and, 
moreover, was constantly harassing the Company's traders with heavy tolls, 
Governor-General Van Diemen and his council in Batavia decided to block­
ade the main Persian port, Bandar Abbas -  'the felicitous harbour of Abbas', 
which the Dutch usually called by its older name, Gamron and from which 
they themselves traded with the empire. The Dutch fleet also attacked and
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occupied the small island of Khism that, with Hormuz, strategically control­
led the Gulf entrance. In a sense, this episode illustrated the dilemma that so 
often faced the VOC in Asia. It had already been worded by the Company's 
officials in Surat, when in 1635 they talked about the role of Persian silk in the 
Company's intra-Asian trade. They wondered 'whether it was wise to foot the 
Company's trade on the ways of sovereign states, which never worry about 
losses, if they but can increase their reputation through warfare and do harm 
to their enemies [...] or if we should organize the affairs of our masters accord­
ing to the rules of a merchant republic, that only seeks to increase its trade'.18
What would have been the consequences if, in 1645, the Heren XVII had 
backed up their representatives in Asia, is difficult to say. However, the 
gentlemen in Holland were furious. Nor in their own eyes, nor before the 
eyes of the world could they accept a situation in which, as they wrote, their 
servants acted like criminals in a country where they were present for com­
mercial purposes only, and, hence, had to accept the conditions set out by the 
indigenous authorities, in this case, of course, the shah. The crisis made the 
XVII review their policy all over Asia, which resulted in the famous General 
Instruction of 1650, outlining and delimitating the position of the Company 
vis-à-vis the various local powers: trade on conditions determined by nego­
tiations rather than anything resembling territorial imperialism was to be 
the basis of the VOC's presence on the coasts of the Indian Ocean and the 
Chinese Sea. Negotiations with Isfahan did indeed follow the incident. They 
took, however, seven years, and were concluded only when, in 1651-1652, 
ambassador Joan Cunaeus, after endless talks, achieved -  well, certainly 
not what he had set out to achieve: free in- and export and duty-free trade 
in Persia itself. No, his mission ended with a new silk-contract, at, from the 
Dutch perspective, only slightly less unfavourable conditions.19
Their authority vindicated, the shahs could think about ways in which 
the Dutch merchants and the Company behind them might be used for 
Persian political purposes. As long as the Safavids maintained their power at 
home, there was little need to ask for support from abroad. However, by the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, rebellion broke out in the north-eastern 
province of Kandahar. This was nominally Mogul territory, but actually it 
was controlled by the fiercely independent Afghan tribes and consequently, 
since its conquest by Abbas II (reigned 1642-1666), in 1648, a problem area.
18 Dunlop 1930:533, no. 262, resolution of the VOC-council in Surat, 6-4-1635: 'ofte [...] 
geraetsaem ware, datt men des Compagnies negotie by een souvereine staet soude vergelycken, 
dewelcke op geen verlies van goet respect nemen, als maer daerby de reputatie van de oorlogen 
vermeerdert en hun vyanden gecrenckt worden [...] dan off men d'affairen van onse principa- 
elen by een coopmansstaet soude ballanceeren, dewelcke alleenlijck trachten hun commertie te 
vergrooten/
19 Hotz 1908; for Cunaeus's initial demands see pp. 155-7, for the final result see pp. 218-40.
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Already in 1652, when Cunaeus was in Isfahan, the problems surrounding 
Kandahar became evident to the Dutch, if only because the royal treasurer har­
assed them continually with urgent questions for financial help to protect the 
city against the Mogul armies.20 A pattern was set. During the reign of Shah 
Hussayn (reigned 1694-1722), we find his government repeatedly 'asking' the 
Company's representatives to assist them with loans to help pay for the cam­
paigns against the Afghans. In the 1710's, the VOC's Isfahan chief consented 
to do so. Thus, the Company invested, albeit, at least according to Batavia, 
unwillingly, in a war that, in the end, led to the fall of the Safavids in 1722.
Already in 1717, the Dutch observed that the situation was becoming 
decidedly unsafe, what with order disappearing even from the streets of 
the capital itself. A year later, the governor-general informed his masters 
that Persia, 'this big colossus [whose court, in consequence of the long years 
of peace, has drowned itself in lust and luxury], is, since some time, being 
undermined by subaltern dukes, governors and others'.21 Decades of neglect 
of the government's standing army, Abbas's great achievement, made it a 
less than effective weapon -  'gering en saemgeraept', or: 'small and a rag­
bag'. Consequently, chaos increased, with inevitable side effects also for the 
Company's trade: the production of wool fell,22 and sericulture was affected, 
too. Years of growing unrest followed. In 1721, the Dutch noted that the 
empire had been 'never as near to its downfall as now', also because 'the 
subjects are, everywhere, rebelling', while the court was unwilling or unable 
to do anything. In early Spring, 1722, the Afghan rebels laid siege to Isfahan. 
After eight months of great hardship for the inhabitants and, indeed, for 
the Company men as well,23 the city surrendered the 22nd of October. Shah 
Hussayn, less concerned about his power and dignity than about a life of 
quiet and luxury, went into exile. Despite promises to the contrary, his family 
did not regain the throne.24 In the turmoil that followed the fall of Isfahan, 
relations between the Safavid court and the Dutch company came to an end, 
almost to a year a century after they had been formally established.25
20 Hotz 1908:169, 212, 214, 259.
21 Generale Missiven VII:377, Governor-General Zwaardecroon to XVII, 6-12-1718 noted that: 
'dat groote gevaarte (welkers hof door de langdurige vreede in wellust en pragt als verdronken 
ligt), sedert eenigen tijd door de subalterne hartogen, gouverneurs ende anderen aen verscheyde 
oirden is en nogh wert geinfesteerd'.
22 For instance Generale Missiven VII:316, Governor-General Zwaardecroon to XVII, 30-11- 
1717, wrote: 'als noyt so na aen de val', also because'd' onderdanen daer alomme revolteren'.
23 Generale Missiven VII:675, Governor-general Zwaardecroon to XVII, 3-12-1722.
24 For the history of the period after the fall of Isfahan see Floor 1998.
25 Despite the downfall of the Safavids, and the decreased importance of the Persian market, 
the VOC continued in Persia till the 1760's, mainly to try and cash the huge debts contracted by 
the Safavid government over the last decades of the seventeenth century, and retrieve the sums 
extorted from them by Shah Hussayn in the 1710s. See Jacobs 2000:125.
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Besides having to worry about the problems on their north-eastern fron­
tier, the shahs also were troubled by the necessity to maintain a balance 
between the many forces trying to control the Gulf, both indigenous -  mostly, 
in fact, the merchant cities on the coast of the Arabian peninsula -  and 
European.26 After having used the English to recapture Hormuz from the 
Portuguese in 1622, Shah Abbas, from the beginning of Persian-Dutch rela­
tions onwards sought the Company's support, precisely to further reduce 
the influence of the Portuguese in the area. Every now and then, suggestions 
were made that the Company help Persia to drive the Portuguese from their 
strategic base at Muscat.27 In the 1630's, this plan matured, when both the 
governor-general and his council and the court at Isfahan seemed ready to 
invest men and money.28 Communications with Holland always being prob­
lematic, it happened that the governor-general wrote to the XVII about the 
execution of these plans on 28 December, 1636, while the XVII's letter telling 
him that he should do no such thing had been dispatched on 26 November. 
In the end, nothing came of the plan, because, in 1637, Isfahan intimated that 
Persia would not participate after all.29 In 1650, the Portuguese lost Muscat, 
not to Persia or to the Company, but to local chieftains, who succeeded in 
capturing the city.
While Portuguese power was thus much reduced, the coastal Arabs
-  especially the new masters of Muscat, who had repeatedly sought to 
gain control over the Gulf -  continued to harass the Safavid empire. In the 
1690s, the Muscateers attacked Bandar Kung, on the pretext of wanting to 
punish the Portuguese merchants trading there. The Persian court did not 
accept this infringement of its sovereignty and mounted a counter-attack. 
Letters went to Batavia, to ask the VOC for help in ships or otherwise. The 
Company declined, adducing the war against France as a reason.30 When, in 
1696 and 1697, the situation deteriorated, the shah even offered to discharge 
the Company of its obligation to annually buy his silk if they would come to 
his aid. Governor-general and council consented to send some ships for the 
non-military assistance of the Persian fleet and army, and even would supply 
the court's general with arms -  but expressly forbade Company men to stand 
with the Persian troops in any actual fighting situation.
In the following decades, the problems in the Gulf continued to vex
26 Barendse 2002 gives a masterly analysis of trade conditions in the region, but is rather slight 
on Dutch-Persian relations.
27 Compare Dunlop 1930:17, no. 17, P. van den Broecke to XVII, 16-3-1623.
28 Dunlop 1930:548, no. 269, Overschie to XVII about the governor-general's orders, 15-12- 
1635. Dunlop 1930:600, no. 292, governor-general and council to the XVII, 28-12-1636. Dunlop 
1930:597, no. 291, XVII to governor -eneral and council, 26-11-1636.
29 Dunlop 1930:615, no. 297, Overschie to governor-general and council, 25-3-1637.
30 Generale missiven V:743, Governor-General Van Outhoorn to XVII, 3-11-1695.
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the court. Thus, in 1715, with Muscat attacking again, Isfahan renewed its 
request for VOC-ships to help combat these marauders. This request they 
then repeated each of the five following years. Though Company trade, too, 
was seriously hampered by the increasing chaos in the area, the authorities in 
Batavia now ordered their men in Persia not to comply with any of the court's 
wishes, arguing that their military involvement in Javanese affairs took all 
the arms and monies and ships that could be spared from trade. The Persian 
government, not willing to take no for an answer, stepped up pressure, which 
became apparent when, in 1717, Jan Josua Ketelaar arrived in Isfahan to nego­
tiate the renewal of the capitulations -  bringing Shah Hussayn six elephants 
as a gift. In 1718, albeit for a short time, the Persians even took possession of 
the Dutch factory in Gamron,31 where poor Ketelaar lay dying. No wonder 
that both court and Company -  however different their interests -  sighed 
with relief when, in 1720, the men from Muscat opened the Gulf again, and 
returned the islands they had conquered to Persia.
Obviously, it is impossible to determine to what extent Safavid power 
may have profited from the Dutch connection during the period 1623-1722. 
We never will be able to establish what financial contribution trade with the 
Dutch actually made to the court's capacity to maintain or increase its hold 
over the empire, the more so since so much of the monies involved went 
through the hands of officials who could not be trusted to actually deposit all 
or even the greater part of it in the royal coffers.
But money, acquired through tolls and other taxes, and the concrete 
military power it could buy was not the only reason why the Safavid shahs 
maintained relations with the Dutch. The power game also was played in 
other fields than war at home or abroad.
Even when the court did not ask for the VOC's actual support, it could use 
the simple fact of the presence of the Company as a weapon in its continu­
ous struggle to keep the Gulf region in some sort of peace and its northern 
shores under Isfahan's control. Thus, it may well be Isfahan hoped the Dutch 
would help to maintain a balance of power with the other European states 
that traded in the region, England and France. However, it seems to me that
-  certainly after the death of Abbas I -  there is little evidence of any conscious, 
long-term Gulf-policy on the Persians' part; this was precluded first of all by 
the very instability of the situation at the centre of the realm, where grand 
vizirs were as easily named as fired and, often, killed. Moreover, as changes 
in the shah's views or in the balance of power at court also affected nomina­
tions to the main government positions in the southern provinces, not even 
regional politics were conducted according to much of a plan. Besides, know­
ing how uncertain their term of office was, most men who were sent there to
31 Generale Missiven VII:377, Governor-General Zwaardecroon to XVII, 6-12-1718.
'Wooninge van de Maetschappye', the VOC lodge at Isfahan. In C. de Bruin, Reizen 
over Moskovièn, door Persie en Indie, plate 107. Amsterdam 1711.
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represent the shah did their best to make hay while the sun shone, even if this 
meant pursuing a policy of their own rather than adhering to the Isfahan-line 
which, if anything, was less than clear.
There were more intangible ways in which the shahs used the VOC 
to maintain or enlarge their power. One of these was gathering informa­
tion from the Company or other foreigners. Indeed, Abbas's policy, which 
brought so many European merchants and, moreover, Christian missionaries 
to Persia, certainly helped not only to gain him a reputation for being a 'great 
prince' -  sought out by men from all over the earth, and tolerant to boot -  but 
also considerably widened his scope: these foreigners were valuable contacts 
with the wider world, and sources of knowledge about it as well. Though 
Abbas's successors were, on the main, weak rulers, who seem to have taken 
little direct interest in the business of state, those who governed Persia in 
their place did know the value of intelligence. Thus, every now and then, one 
hears of this or that senior official asking the Dutch about news from beyond 
the Persian border: from the Ottoman capital, or from the capitals of Europe 
where, of course, decisions were taken that might directly or indirectly affect 
the fate of Persia. Yet again, here, too, there seems to have been no conscious 
policy, that made intelligence gathering in the milieu of the foreign compa­
nies and, of course, the foreign mission posts into a constant bureaucratic 
concern. In the end, the Safavid government does not seem to have had any 
clear idea of the structure of the European states, or of the rules by which 
they played their power game, whether in Europe or in Asia.
Obviously, for the Dutch and other traders, it was pleasant to be able to 
live and work in a cosmopolitan and relatively tolerant state -  even though 
Christianity gained little foothold in Persia. In 1629, ambassador Smid 
succinctly summarized the situation. Writing about the various religious 
orders, he noted: 'they have founded monasteries, but do not reap any 
fruits, because the Persians are stupid and superstitious people'.32 No great 
progress was made in the following decades. Moreover, as I indicated previ­
ously, the Dutch were forbidden to build churches. Nevertheless, the Islamic 
clergy thought the royal attitude towards the Christians too indulgent, still. 
This increased tension between the shahs and the religious establishment, 
which weakened the regime. The changes became apparent when, in the 
early eighteenth century, the court, urged by the sheikh-ul-islam, forced 
the Company to discharge all their Islamic staff and employ Armenian 
Christians instead.33
Even more intangible but certainly of no little concern to the court was the
32 Smid's report in Dunlop 1930:742-3: 'hebben bequame cloosters gesticht, doch [oogsten] 
aldaer geen vruchten, alsoo de Persiaenen botte superstitieuse menschen sijn'.
33 Generale Missiven VII:156-57, Governor-General Van Swoll to XVII, 18-2-1715.
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value of the Company as an element in the representation of power which, 
as all early modern monarchs understood, was as important as power itself. 
Representation was, indeed, a keyword in such policy as the Safavids had. 
They took great care of the magnificence of their personal appearance as well 
as of their palaces and of the ceremony and ritual that took place therein.
During the reign of Abbas especially, the Persian court was widely famous 
for its splendour; even foreign observers wrote about it, and among those 
not only men who stood to gain from such sycophancy. Having established 
Isfahan as his magnificent new capital -  Smid wrote the XVII this had been 
done with the help of thousands of Greek-Christian and Jewish families34 -  
Abbas gathered there poets, scholars and artists of all sorts, who in their vari­
ous ways helped to add lustre to his court, and, thus, his name and reign.35 
He appreciated contributions from foreigners as well. Thus, he employed 
the otherwise unknown painter Jan Lucasz van Hasselt, who later claimed 
he had been greatly esteemed by the shah. Indeed, in 1626, Abbas asked 
him to return to Holland as companion of ambassador Musa Beg. In 1629, 
Abbas's successor, Safi I, giving Van Hasselt glowing credentials, sent him to 
the Republic again, now to act as Persia's ambassador himself.36 During the 
reign of Abbas II, the Dutch diamond cutter Huybert Bufkens -  or Hubregt 
Buffkens -  worked for the shah and his court, and helped facilitate the embas­
sy of Joan Cunaeus in 1651-1652.37 In the same years, one Claes worked as the 
shah's goldsmith. Moreover, from 1651 to 1656, the artist Philip Angel stood 
in the shah's high favour, even teaching him to paint; meanwhile, he also 
acted as the Company's Isfahan agent.38
In the end, the continuous and even increasing expenditure on courtly 
culture, such as new palaces and parties lasting for many days, was, at least 
according to the Dutch, one of the factors contributing to the downfall of the 
dynasty.39 Snide remarks such as the one about Shah Hussayn's 'boundless 
lust for building' -  the embellishment of the town of Farrahabad -  pepper the 
letters of the early eighteenth century.40
To show their royal largesse, both to impress the foreigners and their own 
population, the shahs doled out considerable gifts especially to official visi­
tors, such as VOC-ambassadors travelling to Isfahan. However, these usually
34 Smid's report in Dunlop 1930:739.
35 For the background see Welch 1973.
36 Van Hasselt's credentials are inserted in the resolutions of the States General of 15-6-1630, 
Dunlop 1930:721-2.
37 For Bufkens see Hotz 1908:133-4, 312.
38 Details about these men are found in Leupe 1873:260-6.
39 Generale Missiven VII:156, 317, Governor-General Van Swoll to XVII, 18-2-1715, 30-11-1717.
40 For instance Generale Missiven VII:253, Governor-General Van Swoll to XVII, 30-11-1716: 
'onmatige timmersugt tot Pharabaat'.
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had to be balanced by Dutch counter-gifts, to a value that often was the same 
as, or even superior to that of the royal generosity.41 Moreover, the Persian 
rulers also expected their more official foreign visitors to contribute to the 
splendour of their regime. Thus, the VOC-officials were obliged to attend the 
annual ceremonies of No-Ruz, the Persian New Year, in all their finery and to 
bring gifts as well.42 Specific occasions could be even more costly. When, in 
1636, Shah Safi returned triumphantly from his campaign against the Turks, 
having recaptured the town of Erewan, the Isfahan office of the Company 
erected a magnificent triumphal arch and staged a huge celebration. But 
while this increased their favour with the monarch -  which also helped them 
in their competition with the English, or so they thought -  expenses amount­
ed to some 20% of the net profit of trade with Persia during that year.43
Indeed, anyone approaching the court, wanting to do business with it, did 
well to show a proper reverence, suitably expressed in the magnificence of 
clothes and other forms of representation and, most of all, of occasional gifts 
and more structural donations. As is well known, gift giving was a major 
element in the social and power structures of Asia and, hence, in the policies 
of Asian courts. Right from the start, the Dutch were given to understand the 
importance of properly regaling the shah and, of course, a host of major and 
minor officials down the command chain, insofar as the VOC thought they 
might further its cause.
The Company soon discovered that the costs of these gifts -  especially 
the presents that always should be brought by an embassy -  and of the 
donations, which had to be given on an almost regular, not to say annual 
basis, were onerous indeed, weighing heavily on business profits. Already 
in 1633, Brouwer wrote to the XVII: 'all reasons given to us from here [by 
the VOC-director in Persia] are none other than that the Persian pump and 
circumstance inevitably result in this useless expenditure; but because it 
serves to get into the good graces of the king and the grandees, it cannot be 
avoided'.44 No wonder some VOC-officials asked whether it really was all 
worth its while.
The incessant demand for outlandish objects, too, resulted from the 
court's wish to display its power. Thus, the Company bought 'exceptional 
spyglasses, spectacles and other curiously ground lenses that show strange 
images' for the shah. The grand vizir got his Rhine wine and 'extraordinar-
41 For instance Generale Missiven VII:317, Governor-General Van Swoll to XVII, 30-11-1717.
42 For instance Hotz 1908:145.
43 Dunlop 1930:617, no. 297, Overschie to governor-general and council, 25-3-1637.
44 Generale Missiven 1:381, Governor-General Brouwer to XVII, 15-8-1633: 'alle redenen, die 
ons hiervan werden gegeven [by the VOC-opperhoofd in Persia], sijn niet anders, dan dat de 
Persiaensche pracht soodanige ongelden onmijdelijcken veroorsaecken; ende om bij den Coninck 
en de groote gesien te werden, niet anders en can geschieden'.
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ily big, short-haired dogs', and many other items that all had to be brought 
in from Europe.45 Also, there were such exotic things as Japanese lacquer- 
ware and birds of paradise46 or, on one occasion, the four little elephants 
that, at considerable cost and trouble, had to be hunted in other parts of 
Asia and shipped to Persia.47 Obviously, all the animals and objects thus 
acquired, whether valuable or simply strange, besides, perhaps, to give 
pleasure, served to enhance the public status of their new possessors. 
Sometimes, the court even asked the Company to transport Persian curio 
dealers to Europe, in order that they might do their own 'opcoop van eenige 
rariteyten voor Sijne Mayesteijt'48: they would go shopping to find some 
rare items for the shah.
The representation of power did take other forms as well. For example, 
the shahs every now and then asked the Company for the use of one of its 
ships in order to convey Persian ambassadors to some foreign court -  mostly 
on the Indian subcontinent, but sometimes as far as Siam.49 The Dutch 
authorities were less than happy with these requests, which always entailed 
a considerable financial outlay and, of course, might lead to political or at 
least diplomatic entanglements that they would rather avoid.
Another way the shahs found use for the Dutch was by asking them to 
transport pilgrims to the holy cities on the Red Sea, for though Shiite, most 
Persians did, of course, try to obey the Prophet's wish that they should visit 
Mecca and Medina. As defenders of the faithful, the shahs could not but sup­
port their subjects in their pious plans. By asking the Dutch to act as pilgrim 
shippers, they increased their own religious authority.
Through the Company's eyes: trade on a shoestring or by a silk thread?
Obviously, the reasons that brought the Dutch to Persia were not ones of 
power and representation, but of commerce. Yet, the Persians did not engage 
in sea trade, the VOC officials always noted, somewhat amazed: 'Bij den 
Persiaenen wort de zee niet gefrequenteert':50 the Persians were not keen 
seafarers. One of the reasons was the great scarcity of timber throughout the 
better part of the realm, which almost prohibited extensive shipbuilding.
45 Generale Missiven 11:766, Governor-General Maetsuyker to XVII, 7-11-1654: 'raare ver­
rekijkers, neusbrillen en andere curieuse geslepen glazen, die vreemde vertooningen geven' and 
'extraordinarie groote doggens'.
46 For a list of gifts see Hotz 1908:146.
47 Generale Missiven VII:120, 155, Governor-General Van Swoll to XVII, 26-11-1714,18-2-1715.
48 Generale Missiven 11:766, Governor-General Maetsuyker to XVII, 7-11-1654.
49 For instance Generale Missiven V:84, Governor-General Camphuys to XVII, 28-2-1687.
50 Generale Missiven 1:563, Govenor-General Van Diemen to XVII, 28-12-1636.
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The other was, of course, that, as in many states of Europe, in Persia, too, the 
great noble families, who controlled the country's main wealth, land, were 
traditionally not inclined to sully their hands with trade. Yet, it would be silly 
to say that, therefore, the only reasons for the Isfahan court to deal with the 
Dutch were vaguely geo-political or representational.
Though they did not normally trade themselves, this by no means meant 
the Persian court and the regional elites were not interested in overseas trade; 
on the contrary: many of the luxuries they craved -  such as, for instance, spi­
ces and sugar -  could not be otherwise obtained. Moreover, the centralizing 
policies of the Safavids cost a huge amount of money. Part of it was obtained, 
of course, from taxes but as in many European states their collection was less 
than reliable and, moreover, much of the profits did not reach the centre, 
Isfahan. Meanwhile, an increasing part of the royal revenue came from the 
shahs' private domains -  which Abbas, like his European counterparts in the 
same position, had hugely extended. Still, any other source of income was 
definitely welcome. Thus, siphoning off part of the profits of the tolls levied 
in the harbours on the Gulf coast seemed a good idea -  hence the foundation 
of Bandar Abbas -, especially when combined with the state monopolization 
of products which were particularly cherished by foreign traders; here again, 
the Persian rulers acted as most of their Asian and, for that matter, European 
colleagues did. All this was quite evident to the Company: the shah made 
much money from the duties levied at Bandar Abbas/Gamron and other 
ports and, moreover, precisely through the silk monopoly, was perhaps the 
country's major merchant.51
In order to know what moved the VOC to establish relations with Persia, 
one can do no better than quote Governor-General Coen. In 1627, prior to 
sending Smid to Isfahan, he writes to the Company directors in Amsterdam 
that he hopes 'God will grant the Company that it may retain peaceful trade 
in Persia for a long period, because it is one of the most obvious pillars upon 
which its revenue can be founded in a secure way'.52 Bringing to Persia those 
Dutch or other European wares that could be easily shipped and profitably 
sold in the East made, of course, sense but by and large these were few. Far 
more money could be made from importing and exporting Asian products to 
and from Persia. Consequently, the Persian market soon was part of the net­
work of the Company's intra-Asian trade, without which, of course, the VOC 
would not have survived for long. Hence, the Dutch shipped to Persia what­
ever it felt was saleable there -  most important a variety of textiles from the
51 Generate Missiven 11:419, Governor-General Reniers to XVII, 10-12-1650.
52 Dunlop 1930:218, no. 116, Governor-General Coen to XVII, 9-11-1627: 'God geve, de 
Compagnie lange een vredigen handel in Persia [sal] behouden, a lso 't een van de apparentste 
columnen is daerop 't inlandsch funds sal cunnen [...] gestabileert werden'.
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Indian subcontinent, as well as large quantities of sugar and spices from all 
over Asia and camphor and copper from Japan. Studying the sales' value of 
the Company's imports, one may conclude that it was considerable indeed.
Of course, the VOC took from the Safavid empire whatever could be mar­
keted elsewhere. Two things, however, stood out because, in a sense, they 
were the main reason for bothering with Persia in the first place. Of course, 
there was bullion, the one thing the Company could ill afford to import from 
Europe and always hoped to gain at cheaper rates in the various markets 
of Asia precisely through the profits it made through its intra-Asian trade. 
Persia was one of the sources for precious metals -  much of its gold duc­
ats came to the country through its commerce with Russia and the eastern 
Mediterranean -  but the VOC soon found that most coins were worth less 
than their surface value, due to the Persian government's policy of continual 
debasement. Yet, the VOC could not afford to let this opportunity lie.
Insolubly linked to this necessity, was the silk trade,53 which, according 
to the Dutch, was as profitable to the Persians as to themselves, the internal 
market for silk not being a seller's one. But whatever the profits that could be 
made from silk, the VOC's directors warned their representatives not to pay 
for it in cash -  certainly not in cash that had been loaned at high local interest
-  but with the revenue from its imports.54
For the Company, the practice of trade in Persia did not differ much from 
what they experienced in other Asian states. Life in the four towns where 
they kept an establishment -  Gamron, Kirman, Shiraz and Isfahan -  was 
not always easy for the dozen or so Dutchmen who annually manned these 
factories. Especially Gamron was a dismal place, with temperatures in sum­
mer rising to such extremes that the pitch started dripping from the ships' 
seams, and sealing wax melted on the desks. Trade itself hinged upon the 
Company's good relations with a host of minor and major officials, from 
local tax collectors and customs' officials to the grand vizir. Each and all 
of them had to be continually plied with gifts. They also noted that, due to 
incessant intrigues and changes at court, many of these officials were less 
than certain of the undisturbed enjoyment of their positions; consequently, 
they would use their insecure period of office to try and get as much money 
as possible from the favours they could distribute -  mostly the tasks they 
had to perform anyhow. Hence, the Company was continuously beset with 
polite -  or outright forceful -  demands for more donations. In order to at 
least know who was really important and could not be slighted, and who 
could, perhaps, be kept at bay a little, the VOC's officials in Persia had to
53 Far more details than can be given here, are provided in the important analysis by Matthee 
1999.
54 For instance Dunlop 1930:597 no. 291, XVII to governor-general and council, 26-11-1636.
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keep themselves informed of the rise into and the fall from favour of persons 
at court, in Isfahan -  beginning, of course, with the grand vizir, the 'rijksver- 
trouder', and the nazir, the royal treasurer, who acted as the representative 
of the shah in all matters concerning the silk monopoly When negotiations 
of real importance took place -  such as the ones Cunaeus conducted in 1651- 
1652 to end the hostilities that had begun in 1645 -  also the chief eunuch, the 
chief of the royal bodyguard and a host of other officers-of-state had to be 
'bribed'. Obviously, the Dutch were loath to part with the considerable sums 
involved. Their reports show real rage when they were given to understand 
that no less than 10% of the value of their already expensive gifts to the shah 
himself should be given to his chief door keeper; they called it: 'a custom that 
does not have its like or, at least, is unheard of in Europe'.55
To keep track of the vicissitudes of the governors of the southern region 
and their subordinates was equally important. For example, the Dutch were 
shocked when they realized what happened to the very influential 'hertogh'
-  the khan -  of the province of Shiraz, whom they considered one of their 
well-wishers. In 1633, this Imam Quli Khan and his children were suddenly 
taken prisoner; they were blinded, or maimed in other ways, and in the end 
decapitated. Their heads were shown during a big banquet given by Shah 
Safi, and at which the one surviving son of the family was present. At the 
same time, other provincial governors were executed, too. The VOC-repre- 
sentative in Persia, Nicolaas Overschie, who reported on the matter to the 
Company directors in Amsterdam, realized the members of this family as well 
as the other officials had become too powerful and wealthy -  and thus a threat 
to the court.56 Besides being genuinely dismayed, the Company men also real­
ized how uncertain their agreements with such high officials could be. In this 
specific case this became clear even as late as 1652. During his negotiations 
with the grand vizir, Cunaeus showed him the letters that Imam Khan had 
written in the early 1630s to protect the Dutch from unreasonable financial 
demands by local officials. The 'rijksvertrouder' then said such documents 
could not be honoured at all, for the late Imam Khan might have been 'door 
geschenken ten schade van 't conincrijk daertoe [...] beweegt wesen',57 or: 
gifts might have induced him to thus act in a way detrimental to the realm.
Thus, daily trade was no simple matter of buying and selling on a free 
market, but involved some highly complex network management, that was 
both time and money consuming. Meanwhile, almost from the start, prob­
lems arose between the court and the Company precisely about the two main
55 Hotz 1908:269: 'een gebruyck dat geen weerga heeft off ten minste onder de Europianen 
ongehoort'.
56 Dunlop 1930:423-4, no. 222, Overschie to XVII, 8-5-1633.
57 Hotz 1908:172-3.
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fields of trade. Throughout the period, the Company spent a lot of time find­
ing the ways and means to acquire and then export Persian gold and silver. 
The sources suggest that the court almost constantly tried to make good use 
of the cash weakness of the VOC, mostly by asking them to pay heavy duties 
for all monies exported,58 and sometimes expressly forbidding any transfer 
of bullion to the Company's factory at Bandar Abbas. Due to the Persian 
policy of constant devaluation -  if not outright falsification -  the Company 
officials often asked themselves whether the trouble involved outweighed 
the less than heavy coins they were able to lay hands on.
As to silk, after a few decades of trading with Persia the Company real­
ized it was not the source of profit it had been in the 1620s. By the 1650s, 
prices in Persia had gone up, and, due to imports from other silk-produc­
ing areas, sales profits in Europe had dramatically fallen. Yet, the VOC had 
to continue buying Persian silk, and, moreover, to do so through the royal 
monopoly. A refusal surely would have resulted in their expulsion from the 
realm. This would rob them of both the profits from cheap bullion -  the 'gold 
for goods' balance59 -  and those from the imports of spices and sugar, which 
were continuously growing.60
Meanwhile, the Company did know the shahs were less than able -  or, 
sometimes, willing -  to annually provide them with the amount of silk they 
themselves had stipulated in the contracts -  some 0.12 million pounds in 
1652. They also knew the reasons why. These were manifold. Sometimes, 
the annual yield of raw silk simply was not enough to gather the necessary 
consignments, due to, among other reasons, diseases among the silkworms, 
or in the plants they fed upon, or to local administrative or political problems 
in the silk districts. Also, when silk was scarce, the market price rose above 
the sum set beforehand in the multi-annual Dutch contract.
Obviously, this inconvenienced the court vis-à-vis the Company: while 
the VOC would then insist on buying the silk at the set value, the shah 
might reason he was better off selling it to another party on the free market. 
His officials then would procrastinate, either trying to fob off the Company 
with a smaller amount, or trying to get them to pay a higher price. Often, 
the Company simply did not receive its consignment, or had to accept pay­
ing more -  which they sometimes tried to avoid by bribing the very officials 
involved in upholding the royal monopoly. The VOC, on the other hand, soon 
found the silk contract was a restrictive and troublesome agreement as well,
58 For instance Generale Missiven VII:376, Governor-general Zwaardecroon to XVII, 6-12-1718.
59 The emphasis on this exchange changed through the Company's history, as has been 
explained by Gaastra 1976.
60 By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the VOC imported some 500,000 pounds of 
spices and some 1,500,000 pounds of sugar. See Jacobs 2000:123 and her Table 18.
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for these very same reasons: when the court did not honour its obligations, 
their silk dealings in Europe were jeopardized; if they had to pay too high a 
price, their profits -  already falling -  were totally spoiled. Moreover, when, 
as happened sometimes, production of silk was abundant, and the shah did 
chose to honour his agreement, the Dutch might find they had to buy at the 
agreed price while, on the open market, silk was available much cheaper.
Despite all these problems the Persian court, juggling the monopoly as it 
saw fit, tried to maintain the contract situation, for even though it might not 
yield a profit when circumstances occurred such as those outlined above, the 
contract always was a very visible means to express its power towards the 
foreigners. In fact, the contract was their perpetual weapon against the Dutch 
as the Company's overall trade in Persia hinged on it: the VOC's licence to 
export bullion and to buy and sell other products without paying a heavy 
amount of tolls and other taxes had been made conditional on its acceptance 
of these silken conditions. The dramatic episode of 1645, when the Dutch 
threatened Persia's territorial integrity by occupying Bandar Abbas and the 
island of Khism, represented a first attempt to effectively break the royal 
monopoly, as the VOC men wanted to gain the right to freely trade in silk all 
over the empire, and export it without paying customs duties. However, as I 
indicated above, the Company's central management thought this action far 
too dangerous, and even illegal.
Nevertheless, in 1684, another generation of VOC-officials again felt the 
contract to be too irksome.61 The Company repeated its action of 1645: it 
decided to temporarily detain all 'Moorse schepen' carrying goods for Persian 
merchants, 'hoping that the complaints which this would cause, if brought to 
court by the interested parties, would make the king realize he would have to 
look into our business and demands himself, or at least specifically appoint 
commissars to do so'.62 This policy enraged the court. But Batavia decided 
to play for high stakes. They moved the Gamron-staff onto their ships, and 
again occupied Khism. It was then that the court asked for a negotiator. To 
show their willingness to return to normalcy, the VOC-men evacuated the 
island.63 However, nothing happened. In 1686, the governor-general and 
his council ordered that products destined for Gamron were not to be sold, 
there, and threatened to dismantle their establishments in Persia altogether.64
61 As clearly stated in Generate Missiven IV:773, by Governor-General Camphuys to XVII, 12- 
2-1685.
62 Generale Missiven IV:741-2, Governor-General Camphuys to XVII, 30-11-1684: "op hoope dat 
de klagten daarover, door de geintresseerden ten hove gebragt wesende, den Coninck souden 
doen omsien en onse saecken en pretentien selven examineren off ten minstens door expressen 
commissarissen sulx te laten doen'.
63 Generale Missiven IV:826, Governor-General Camphuys to XVII, 11-12-1685,
64 Generale Missiven V:63, Governor-General Camphuys to XVII, 13-12-1686.
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In 1688, they wrote to the XVII that the very slowness of the negotiations 
showed the use of arms did not, in fact, impress the court: the Company's 
presence in Persia depended on its acceptance of the royal monopoly: 'van 
's Compagnies magt te spreecken en te dreygen [kwam in] grooten handel- 
rijcken [such as Persia] geheel niet te passe',65 or: in such great empires it did 
not behove to speak about the Company's power and use it as a threat. For 
years, things dragged on. In 1691, a formal ambassador was sent, Joan van 
Leenen. He boldly asked for the annulment of the silk contract, freedom of 
customs' duties and the renewal of all old privileges.66 However, he soon 
had to make concessions -  as had the Persians, who agreed that though they 
would not abolish the contract, they would accept the annual amount of silk 
to be bought at a lower price. The Dutch were not satisfied. All these years, 
there were VOC-servants who favoured a military option, including a block­
ade of the Gulf -  but the Council of the Indies reasoned this was too expensive 
and would enrage both other European powers trading in the region, and the 
Indian merchants with their important Persian interests.67 Others argued the 
Company would be better off if the contract were broken even if this meant 
it had to pay heavy duties and other tolls for all in- and exports. Meanwhile, 
the court often did not force the annual silk consignment on the Company, 
sometimes because it could sell more profitably elsewhere. But though this 
was a relief, the insecurity of the situation was intolerable.
In the end, the XVII and Batavia argued it was only the contract that gave 
the Company anything remotely resembling a secure foothold in the Safavid 
empire: all other trade depended on the goodwill that accepting the royal silk 
monopoly realized both at court and with all subordinate officials involved.68 
Moreover, the Council of the Indies now reasoned that its imports into Persia 
were, in a sense, far more profitably paid for by the acquisition of silk, which, 
despite stiff competition within the market, could still be traded in Europe, 
than with the debased Persian coins that by now were considered no good 
either in Asia or in Europe.69 To free themselves of the continual harassment
-  and the paying of ever larger bribes -  the differences finally were patched 
up in 1696, with the Company agreeing to a new silk contract that did not 
materially alter the previous conditions they so much had tried to change.70 
Thus, from the Dutch perspective, trade with Persia continued to hang by a 
silk thread, indeed.
65 Generale Missiven V:232, Governor-General Camphuys to XVII, 27-12-1688.
66 Generale Missiven V:485-6, Governor-General Van Outhoorn to XVII, 31-1-1692.
67 Generale Missiven V:557, Governor-General Van Outhoorn to XVII, 11-12-1692.
68 Generale Missiven V:704, Governor-General Van Outhoorn to XVII, 30-11-1694.
69 Generale Missiven V:706, Governor-General Van Outhoorn to XVII, 30-11-1694.
70 Generale Missiven V:810, Governor-General Van Outhoorn to XVII, 19-1-1697.
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